On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty by Fleckinger, Pierre
On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological
Uncertainty
Pierre Fleckinger
To cite this version:
Pierre Fleckinger. On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty. CECO-1695.
2007. <hal-00240716>
HAL Id: hal-00240716
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00240716
Submitted on 6 Feb 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty 
 
 
 
Pierre Fleckinger 
 
 
 
Septembre 2007 
 
 
Cahier n° 2007-27 
 
 
 
          ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE         
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
 
LABORATOIRE D'ECONOMETRIE 
1rue Descartes F-75005 Paris 
(33) 1 55558215 
 http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/  
mailto:lyza.racon@shs.poly.polytechnique.fr 
 
 
 
On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty1 
 
 
 
Pierre Fleckinger2 
 
 
 
Septembre 2007 
 
 
Cahier n° 2007-27 
 
Résumé: Ce papier réexamine la question de la forme optimale des incitations en termes de 
concurrence et coopération dans un contexte d'aléa moral avec plusieurs agents. Une 
analyse détaillée de la connaissance imparfaite sur la technologie permet d'obtenir de 
nouveaux résultats. En général, le schéma optimal est collectif quand la production est 
complémentaire, et compétitif quand les efforts sont substituts. En conséquence, l'idée très 
répandue que le principal doit utiliser un schéma d'autant plus concurrentiel que les 
performances sont corrélées à l'équilibre n'est pas valide quand les agents sont neutres au 
risque. En effet, des niveaux de corrélation croissant avec les efforts des agents créent une 
forme de complémentarité informationnelle, qui plaide pour des schémas collectifs. Quand 
les agents sont averses au risque, cet effet informationnel est à mettre en balance avec la 
demande d'assurance des agents. Le schéma optimal est alors soit concurrentiel, soit 
mixte, ce qui est une nouveauté dans la littérature. Les schémas mixtes peuvent être 
interprétés comme l'utilisation conjointe de plans de partage des gains et de clauses de 
licenciement ou de promotion. 
 
Abstract: This paper reexamines the issue of competitive versus collective incentives in a multiagent 
moral hazard framework. A detailed analysis of imperfect knowledge on the technology - 
or uncertainty - is the key to new results. The baseline fact is that under complementarity 
the optimal scheme is collective, while it is competitive under substitutability. As a 
consequence, the widespread idea that a principal should use all the more competitive 
scheme that the equilibrium outcomes are more correlated is shown not to hold under risk-
neutrality. This is so because equilibrium correlation levels increasing with effort create a 
form of informational complementarities, and therefore pleads for cooperative schemes. 
When the agents are risk-averse, that informational effect has to be traded off against the 
agents' insurance concerns. The optimal scheme is then either competitive or mixed, a 
novelty in the contracting literature. Mixed schemes can be interpreted as the use of 
aggregate profit sharing in combination with selective firing or promotion. 
 
Mots clés : Aléa moral multi-agent; corrélation; incertitude; Evaluation jointe versus Evaluation 
relative 
 
Key Words : Multi-agent moral hazard; Correlation; Uncertainty; Relative vs Joint Performance 
Evaluation.      
 
Classification JEL: D8, L2, O3. 
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1 Introduction
When the performances of many agents are correlated, agency theory traditionally indi-
cates that competition between them allows to reduce incentive costs. This paper offers a
reconsideration of this view by giving a closer look at the informational structure of multi-
agent settings. In particular, the analysis unveils a new informational effect of correlation
that sometimes runs counter to the traditional perspective. The common view says the
following: if performances are positively correlated, a good result of one agents indicates
a favorable environment, and therefore one agent’s compensation should depend nega-
tively on the other’s performance in order not to reward luck. An alternative view says in
turn that when performances get more correlated when both agents exert more effort, a
good performance of one agent is a good indication that the other also worked hard, and
therefore high performance of one agent should positively influence the other’s reward.
The analysis shows that the first view is indeed incomplete in that it does not take prop-
erly into account how the correlation varies with the choice of action.
With multiple agents, the literature has since the beginning emphasized the role of
relative performance evaluation, prominently the early tournament literature, e.g. Lazear
and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). Those au-
thors have shown in particular that competition between agents is all the more valuable
that the common risk associated with individual production increases1. This is rooted
in the multiagent application of Holmstro¨m (1979) sufficient statistics result, by Holm-
stro¨m (1982) and Mookherjee (1984). However, this key result only asserts that the re-
ward for one agent should depend on the performance of the other agent, but by no
means commands that the type of evaluation should be relative. It is often mistakenly
taken as an argument for competitive provision of incentives. From a broad theoretical
point of view, results are not that clear-cut. On the one hand works on general stochas-
tic structures in multiagent problems - e.g. Mookherjee (1984); Ma (1988); Brusco (1997)
and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1998) for the case of partnerships - can not provide
answer on the desirability of competition in teams, and on the other hand, specific works
on that topic consider special informational structures or restricted contract forms (e.g.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1990; Ramakrishnan and Takor, 1991; Itoh, 1992; Che and Yoo,
2001). The setting analyzed in the following helps contributes to filling this gap by pro-
1This is also the case with correlated private information. Competition allows to crosscheck messages
and reduce rents, see Demski and Sappington (1984) for an early contribution.
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viding a framework that generalizes many models on the topic, while still allowing for
a full characterization of the optimal incentive scheme. In particular, it is possible to de-
rive results also for the case of non-uniform correlation of the results2 which happens to
be crucial. A broader interpretation of the information structure including technological
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, not only observation noise, is then possible.
Following Che and Yoo (2001), we will use the terminology relative performance eval-
uation (RPE) and joint performance evaluation (JPE) to distinguish the two usual ways of
paying the agents3. A central issue is when one or the other kind of scheme is the opti-
mal one. We consider both the cases of risk-neutral agents subject to limited liability, and
the case of risk-averse agents under a standard participation constraint. Those two cases
constitute in fact the two sides of the same coin. This allows to decompose the problem
between the two main effects at work: the informational effect, by which the principal
gets information on the technology and infers effort, and the insurance effect associated
with relative performance evaluation.
Under this general information structure, the scope for relative performance evalua-
tion is reduced compared to what is usually believed. In particular, correlation of per-
formances is not per se an argument in favor of RPE. On the contrary, more correlation
of equilibrium performance sometimes pleads for less competitive schemes: The infor-
mational effect speaks in favor of management through induced cooperation rather than
competition. When including insurance concerns (with risk-aversion), this effect is weak-
ened, but a collective bonus is still optimal in some circumstances. In those cases, the opti-
mal scheme has the following appealing interpretation: a basic incentive tool is aggregate
profit sharing (provided by stock-options, shares distribution and the like), used in com-
bination with selective promotions or failures. To our knowledge, that type of schemes
2By construction, the linear-exponential-normal model has a uniform correlation over effort pairs. In
Mookherjee (1984) and Ramakrishnan and Takor (1991), the papers closest to our setting regarding the
information structure, the level of correlation is in fact the same irrespective of the action chosen, see
Mookherjee (1984, pp. 441-442) and Ramakrishnan and Takor (1991, pp. 259-260, in particular the be-
ginning of section 4.2)
3We abstract from (potentially beneficial) cooperative agreements between the agents. Side-transfers
and better observation among the agents may by themselves be reasons for cooperative schemes, see for
example Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1992). See also Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998) for a model of
sequential efforts in a limited liability framework close to the one developed here. Their focus is however
on collusion, a topic not treated here.
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has not been theoretically studied, nor has its (second-best) efficiency been demonstrated.
One should also underline the link with some models of ambiguity. As in traditional
in the agency literature, the model stays within the comfortable framework of subjective
expected utility and Bayesian probabilities. That is we use the Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) framework, and therefore preserve the reduction of compound lotteries property
and keep additivity of all probability (i.e. we do not use Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
or Ghirardato et al. (2004) constructions to introduce uncertainty aversion). But the mul-
tiagent nature of the framework is itself the source of a Bayesian ambiguity effect in the
problem. In that respect, the closest paper is Halevy and Feltkamp (2005). Essentially,
they extend Ellsberg’s famous thought experiment by one draw: bets are on two succes-
sive draws from the same urn. Their results is that under such circumstances, a purely
Bayesian decision-maker will be uncertainty-averse as soon as he is risk-averse. Roughly4,
the present model has in common shares with that paper the ”double draw effect”. An
interesting aspect is that even under risk-neutrality of the agents, the principal can use
uncertainty, and he is in fact better off with ambiguity than without.
In the next section, we set up the model and state the main definitions. Then in the
third section we derive the optimal contract under risk-neutrality and limited liability and
apply it to various examples. The fourth section deals with risk-aversion and insurance.
The last section concludes. Omitted proof are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model under risk-neutrality and preliminary analysis
2.1 Basics
We consider a setting of moral hazard in which two agents, called 1 and 2, work on two
different projects. The principal and the agents share the same beliefs on the technology.
All players are risk-neutral in the present and the following section, and we relax this as-
sumption in the fourth section by considering risk-averse agents. Following Itoh (1991),
Ramakrishnan and Takor (1991) and Che and Yoo (2001), the outcome of each project is ei-
ther a success or a failure, worth respectively S and F to the principal, and these outcomes
are contractible. We denote by R a generic result pair, taking value in {SS, SF, FS, FF}.
4This is a rough parallel in that it abstracts from incentive concerns.
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Each agent privately chooses whether he exerts effort or not: agent 1 chooses e ∈ {0, 1}
and agent 2 chooses f ∈ {0, 1}. Those actions are never observed by the other players.
We assume without loss of generality that c(e) = c.e and c( f ) = c. f . The probability of
obtaining outcome R conditional on effort pair (e, f ) is Prob[R|e, f ]. Finally, we consider
only projects for which it is worth inducing the agents to work, which amounts to assume
that S− F is sufficiently high compared to c. This also renders the assumption of identical
payoffs and costs innocuous.
2.2 Incentive Schemes
The performances of the agents are generically related, so that their wages should be tied.
The incentive scheme (or wage profile) for agent 1 is thus a collection
w = {wSS, wSF, wFS, wFF}
that represents the wage he receives contingent on his result - the first index - and on the
second agent’s result - the second index. The wage scheme of agent 2 is denoted by x and
follows the same conventions. In practice, the problem is symmetric and separable and
we mainly focus on the case of agent 1 only. Given an outcome-contingent wage scheme
w and a pair of efforts (e, f ), the expected payoffs are:
U1(w|e, f ) = ER [wR|e, f ]− c(e)
U2(x|e, f ) = ER [xR|e, f ]− c( f )
From each agent’s point of view, there are overall three stochastic sources in that pay-
ment: first, there is imperfect knowledge on the technology - a specificity of this pa-
per, second, the result of his effort is non-deterministic - as is standard in moral hazard
settings, and third his remuneration also depends on the other agent’s performance - a
feature of the two-agent setting. The expectation operator pertains to the three random
elements. Since there is a finite number of outcomes, we can write the expected wage as
a weighted average, where the weight on wR is Prob(R|e, f ).
A central question of the analysis is: When will the principal use competition as an
incentive device, and when will he prefer to induce cooperative behavior between the
agents? To give a precise content to this question, we borrow from Che and Yoo (2001)
the typology for the incentive systems.
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Definition 1 (Standard incentives schemes)
An incentive scheme exhibits Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) when:
(wSF, wFF) > (wSS, wFS)
An incentive scheme exhibits Joint Performance Evaluation (JPE) when:
(wSS, wFS) > (wSF, wFF)
An incentive scheme exhibits Independent Performance Evaluation when:
(wSS, wFS) = (wSF, wFF)
The inequalities represent component-wise comparison with at least one strict in-
equality. With RPE, an agent is better off when the other fails, while it is the converse
with JPE. Therefore, RPE is competitive while JPE gives collaborative incentives5. Note
that these three types of scheme do not exhaust the possible ordering of wages, and in-
deed additional configurations appear in the fourth section.
2.3 Implementation and generic results
As already mentioned, it is assumed that the principal wants both agent to exert effort,
so that we limit ourselves to minimizing the cost of implementing (1, 1) as a Nash equi-
librium (not necessarily a unique one). The incentive constraints for each agent provided
the other exerts effort write:
U1(w|1, 1) ≥ U1(w|0, 1) (1)
U2(x|1, 1) ≥ U2(x|1, 0) (2)
In addition, we assume that the agents are subject to limited liability, so that the following
constraints hold:
w, x ≥ 0 (3)
5Strictly speaking, there is no collaboration in the case of a JPE scheme, since an agent can not influence
the other’s result in this model beyond his single effort choice. Accounting for wider possibilities would
require to enrich the action space to account for sabotage (Lazear, 1989) or help (Itoh, 1991). Note also that
JPE and RPE rises different collusion concerns (See Brusco, 1997, for a broad analysis of collusion).
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Invoking the first-order approach, the principal’s objective is to minimize the sum of
transfers under the previous constraints:
min
w,x
ER [wR + xR|1, 1]
subect to (1), (2), (3)
It is however possible to deal with a simplified problem as the next observation indicates.
Lemma 1 The program of the principal is separable in two independent optimizations, one for
each agent.
This result is useful for simplifying the exposition. The separability follows from two
facts: First, since the principal is risk neutral, the objective function is linear in wages,
and second, the constraints feature the wages of only one agent at a time, and they can
thus be divided into two independent sets. In the following, we consequently restrict
attention to the program pertaining to agent 1. In other words, we consider only one
side of the problem, but the other can be dealt with in the exact same way. Since for the
remaining of the analysis we stick to agent 1’s point of view, the following definitions
are implicitly given for agent 1 only. Those definitions will help grasping some economic
intuition during the resolution.
Definition 2 For any pair of results R, the effort informativeness of R is:
h(R) =
Prob(R|1, 1)
Prob(R|0, 1)
To clarify why we call informativeness this ratio, it is illustrative to consider one of
them, h(SS). It is the likelihood ratio between effort and shirking for the first agent upon
observing two successes, conditional on the other agent exerting effort. The higher h(SS)
is, the more likely it is upon observing two successes that the agent has exerted effort
and not shirked. The different possible results carry more or less information about the
choice of effort, and h is a measure of that information. Note that in this definition we
only consider cases in which agent 2 exerts effort, since in the end we are concerned with
the implementation of two efforts.
Definition 3 For any pair of results R, the incentive efficiency of wR is:
I(R) = 1− 1
h(R)
=
Prob(R|1, 1)− Prob(R|0, 1)
Prob(R|1, 1)
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The right-hand side is the ratio between the coefficient of the wage wR in the incentive
constraint and the probability of paying this wage. This is therefore the (constant) ratio
of marginal incentive and marginal costs for that wage, which explains the notion of in-
centive efficiency. Note that it is at most 1, in which case the wage is fully effective, since
the result R then indicates with certainty that the agent has exerted effort.
Two remarks are in order about these two definitions. First, in a setting with one single
agent and binary outcomes, these two concepts are trivial, but they make sense when the
outcome space in richer, as with multiple agents or additional signals (see Laffont and
Martimort, 2002, pp. 167-172). Second, note that a result R is more informative than
a result R′ if and only if the associated wage wR is more incentive efficient than wR′ .
In other words, it is equivalent to reason in terms of how to best infer the action or in
terms of how to spread optimally the incentive weight. The next result will be useful in
characterizing the optimal incentive scheme.
Lemma 2 Under risk-neutrality and limited liability, an optimal incentive scheme entails positive
wages only for the result(s) with the highest incentive efficiency.
The lemma expresses the intuitive idea that the incentive weight should be put on the
outcomes that are most efficient at inducing effort. In fact, since the principal’s objective
is linear, the result is even more extreme, and all the weight will generically be put on one
single wage.
We are now in position of grasping a generic flavor of the situations under which the
optimal scheme exhibits RPE or JPE. Another definition is needed, once again limiting us
to the point of view of agent 1.
Definition 4 Effort e is a strong complement (resp. substitute) to effort f if:
Prob(.S|1, 1)
Prob(.F|1, 1) ≥ (≤)
Prob(.S|0, 1)
Prob(.F|0, 1)
That is, when agent 1 exerts effort, this increases the likelihood of a success relative to a
failure for agent 2 (for any result of agent 1). Note that this relationship is not symmetric,
since it may well be the case that effort f is detrimental to the success of the first project.
In any case, we have the following result.
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Proposition 1 The optimal incentive scheme of agent 1 exhibits JPE (resp. RPE) if and only if
effort e is a strong complement (resp. substitute) to effort f .
Keeping as a reference this generic insight that collective schemes are optimal under
(some notion of) complementarity6, and relative performance evaluation optimal under
substitutability, we investigate now the information structure in more details.
3 Main result under risk-neutrality
3.1 Informational setting
No restrictions where yet imposed on how efforts interact in the production process.
From now on, we will focus exclusively on the informational dimension of the prob-
lem. To do so, we assume away cross-effects of efforts: The probability of success for each
project depends only on the effort of the corresponding agent. We assume that the prob-
abilities of success conditional on effort are not known with certainty7. All players hold
the same beliefs on that probabilities. For agent 1, the success probability conditional on
effort e is the random variable p˜e, and it is q˜ f for agent 2. In the following we use the
notations:
pe = E[ p˜e], σ2e = var( p˜e), q f = E[q˜ f ], τ
2
f = var(q˜ f )
6It is worthwhile observing that Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) obtain a related result in the case of
competing structures, each with one principal and one agent. When firms compete a` la Cournot, the actions
of the agents - quantity choices - are strategic substitutes, and RPE is desirable for the principals, while JPE
is optimal under Bertrand competition, under which agents’ actions are strategic complements. In fact, the
present model could also be applied to competing structures, insofar as each principal wants his agent to
exert effort. Indeed, in such a case, both agents will exert effort in equilibrium and therefore the incentive
constraint in each competing structure is the same as that for each agent in an integrated structure. We do
not elaborate here on this issue, but interesting predictions might be derived in the field of top executives
compensation.
7The reader will notice the link with the classical two-armed bandit problem. Two-armed bandits are
classically equipped with one safe and one risky arm, see for example Bolton and Harris (1999). DeGroot
(1970, pp. 399-405) contains a model of two-armed-bandit with dependent arms which is the closest setting
up to our knowledge. However it consists of an example in which the two Bernoulli parameters have two
points supports.
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We allow any correlation between the results in case of high effort and low effort, but the
following correlation parameters are central:
ρe, f =
cov( p˜e, q˜ f )
σeτf
This is the most general form of imperfect knowledge one can introduce in the present
setting. Note that the correlation coefficient pertains to the beliefs on the technology, and
is therefore not directly representing the correlation of outcomes as is often the case.
Although intuitive lemma 2 can be, it still leaves the door open to much less intuitive
indications regarding optimal schemes. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 1 Extreme innovation.
Consider symmetric agents using identical technologies. Assume that an old well-known
technology yields at no cost a success with probability p0(= q0). In turn, the new tech-
nology might either perfectly fit, with probability p1 > p0, in which case it would yield
a success with probability 1, or be completely useless, yielding a failure for sure. Using
the new technology requires a learning cost c. Here p˜1(= q˜1) is a binomial distribution
with parameter p1 - and consequently variance σ21 = p1(1− p1). Simple calculations yield
h(SS) = 1p0 , h(SF) = h(FS) = 0 and h(FF) =
1
1−p0 . Thus if p0 >
1
2 , the highest likelihood
ratio is that of a double failure: agents should be compensated only in that state.
There may thus be counter-intuitive situations in which agents are rewarded only
upon obtaining two failures, such as that described in example 1. Note however that
in example 1 the Nash equilibrium that the principal would like to implement may be
Pareto-dominated from the agents point of view. Indeed, for small enough p0 relative
to p1, they are better off in the shirk-shirk equilibrium (for any wFF). Tacit coordination
of the agents on their Pareto-optimal equilibrium8 could be by itself a reason not to use a
scheme with wFF > 0, since this would encourage the worst behavior from the principal’s
point of view. We will simply rule out such situations by the following assumption on
the technology, and we will not impose here unique implementation.
8The topic of unique and/or undominated implementation is of interest in itself. It has been thoroughly
studied since the early contributions of Ma (1988) and Ma et al. (1988). For the closest settings, see in
particular Arya and Glover (1995) and Arya et al. (1997).
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Assumption 1 (Effective Effort) Prob( p˜1 ≥ p˜0) = 1
This quite natural assumption says that any draw for the technology in case of effort
is better than any possible draw in absence of effort. Therefore, exerting effort always
(weakly) increases the probability of success. This does not mean that effort is always
efficient, since efficiency considerations should also take into account the cost c. Example
1 is ruled out because in some states success could be less likely when the agents exerted
effort. The assumption is stronger than needed for our results, but it has the advantage of
being perfectly transparent. A useful consequence of assumption 1 is the following.
Lemma 3 Under assumption 1, an optimal scheme entails wFF = wFS = 0.
In fact, for any result of agent 2, the assumption implies that a failure of agent 1 is
always ranked below a success in terms of incentive efficiency.
3.2 Main result
We are now in position to fully characterize the optimal incentive scheme. This is done in
the next proposition, using the definition:
γ =
σ0
p0
p1
σ1
(4)
Proposition 2 Under assumption 1, the optimal wage profile is:
if ρ11ρ01 < γ, a RPE scheme with
wSF =
c
(1− q1)(p1 − p0)− τ1(ρ11σ1 − ρ01σ0) , wSS = wFS = wFF = 0
if ρ11ρ01 > γ, a JPE scheme with
wSS =
c
q1(p1 − p0) + τ1(ρ11σ1 − ρ01σ0) , wSF = wFS = wFF = 0
if ρ11ρ01 = γ, any scheme (possibly IPE) with
(q1 +
τ1
p0
)wSS + (1− q1 − τ1p0 )wSF =
c
p1 − p0 , wFS = wFF = 0
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The criterion for relative vs joint performance evaluation, though it looks very sim-
ple, has a rich economic content. On the technical side, it is completely generic in that it
does not depend on any assumption on the shape of the underlying distributions9, nor
on whether they are discrete or continuous, and so on. Also, it depends only on the prop-
erties of the distributions, so that it is purely informational, while proposition 1 included
the technological dimension. We can however relate this result to the link between ef-
fort complementarity and JPE demonstrated in the first proposition. We have on the one
hand:
Prob(SS|1, 1)
Prob(SF|1, 1) =
p1q1 + ρ11σ1τ1
p1(1− q1)− ρ11σ1τ1
which is increasing in ρ11 and on the other hand:
Prob(SS|0, 1)
Prob(SF|0, 1) =
p0q1 + ρ01σ0τ1
p0(1− q1)− ρ01σ1τ1
which is increasing in ρ01. Following definition 4, the effort of the first agent is all the more
complementary (for successes) to that of the second agent that ρ11 is relatively higher than
ρ01. According to proposition 1, such complementarity calls for JPE. In that sense, propo-
sition 2 emphasizes that correlation creates partial informational complementarities.
Proposition 2 makes an important connection between two dimensions: First, the cor-
relation conditional on effort and second the effect of effort on the variability of the result.
The first dimension is a pure multiagent effect, while the second is a pure single agent ef-
fect (γ depends only on the agent’s choice). The coefficient of variation σepe is a measure
of how noisy the success signal is depending on effort. If γ is smaller than 1, effort in-
creases this noise10, while it decreases noise if γ is higher than 1. Regarding correlations,
if the ratio ρ11ρ01 is higher than 1, the results of the agents are more correlated when they
choose the same actions than when they choose different actions. This ratio is new in the
multiagent analysis since previous papers consider uniform correlation11. What matters
in the choice between RPE and JPE is the relative quality of information between the two
possible actions for one agent, and how the correlation between results varies with the
9In the multiagent models mentioned in the introduction, almost all distributions are either multivariate
normal representing additive noise or two-point distributions.
10Whether exerting more effort increases noise or not and what are the consequences for the career
concern model is a point discussed in Dewatripont et al. (1999).
11Ramakrishnan and Takor (1991) insist on the role of conditional correlation, but as they mention p. 260,
the agents take the value of the correlation as exogenous in their model. It seems reasonable to assume that
sophisticated agents take into account the fact that the correlation varies with their own choice of action.
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different actions.
We finish this discussion by two corollaries to proposition 2.
Corollary 1 An increase in the equilibrium correlation of the results favors JPE.
Proof. The equilibrium covariance of the two results is cov( p˜1S + (1− p˜1)F, q˜1S + (1−
q˜1)F) = (S − F)2ρ11σ1τ1, while the variances of the results are var( p˜1S + (1− p˜1)F) =
(S− F)2σ21 and var(q˜1S+ (1− q˜1)F) = (S− F)2τ21 . The equilibrium correlation is thus ex-
actly ρ11, and an increase ρ11 increases the desirability of JPE from the criterion of propo-
sition 2.
This observation runs counter to usual results. This is the most striking consequence
of the informational complementarity effect. Other models focus on the idea that good
performances indicate a favorable environment and that this favorable noise should be
filtered by RPE, while a previously ignored effect is here at work: A good result of the
other agent might also be a good signal of effort under high equilibrium correlation.
Corollary 2 The principal always benefits from uncertainty on the technology.
Proof. The expected gains of the principal do not depend on uncertainty. While with per-
fect knowledge of the technology, the principal would use independent schemes, with
imperfect knowledge, he can still use a pair of independent contract (IPE) but it is not
optimal. Therefore he earns more with RPE or JPE and thus benefits from the uncertainty.
It has already been remarked a number of times in the literature that correlation helps
reducing rents, smoothes information revelation and so on. Here, the same positive con-
clusion can be drawn with respect to uncertainty in general, provided all the players are
risk-neutral.
3.3 Examples
To illustrate further the main result, we briefly apply it to usual forms of uncertainty
that have been considered in the literature. The optimal scheme is RPE in the first three
examples, while it is IPE or JPE in the last two ones.
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Example 2 The additive model.
The most classical way of introducing technological uncertainty amounts in our discrete
model to the following form of uncertainty:
p˜e = pe + ε
q˜ f = q f + η
where ε and η are random variables with zero means, variances σ2 and correlation coef-
ficient ρ. What matters here is that the noise is additively separable from the influence of
the action. Note that the variance of the probability of success depends only on ε, which
implies σ0 = σ1 = τ0 = τ1 = σ. All pairs ( p˜e, q˜ f ) have the same correlation ρ, so that
ρ11
ρ01
= 1. Also, γ = σ0p0
p1
σ1
= p1p0 > 1. Therefore, according to proposition 2, RPE is always
optimal with additive uncertainty. That formulation of additive uncertainty parallels that
of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). We have shown that this
setting favors competition between agents, even abstracting from risk-sharing concerns.
Example 3 Effort is sometimes irrelevant.
Che and Yoo (2001) use an original information structure. They assume that with some
probability ν, the technology is such that a project is a success regardless of effort12, and
with probability (1− ν), the technology is such that the outcome depends on the effort.
Let us denote the probability of success in that case by re. Overall, this corresponds to the
situation:
{ p˜0, p˜1} = {q˜0, q˜1} =
{
{1, 1} with probability ν
{r0, r1} with probability (1− ν)
The relationships with our notations are simply:
re =
pe − ν
1− ν , σ
2
e =
ν
1− ν (1− pe)
2 and ρe f = 1
Therefore, since we have here γ = p1(1−p0)
2
p0(1−p1)2 > 1, this setting generates RPE as optimal
incentive scheme13.
12It is unimportant that the probabilities are exactly 1, what matters is that they are the same in some
state of the world, making effort irrelevant in that state.
13To be clear, the contribution of Che and Yoo (2001) is precisely to show that, while in this static setting
RPE is optimal, JPE becomes optimal in the infinitely repeated version of the problem. One contribution
of this paper is to give a definite answer to their footnote 16, p. 530-531 regarding how the form of the
common shocks affects the choice RPE vs JPE in the static setting.
14
The next example focuses on negative correlation.
Example 4 Umbrellas versus sunglasses.
Consider a shop with two divisions, the first responsible for sunglasses and the other for
umbrellas. Before the weather is known to be rainy or sunny, they have to decide whether
to buy additional products, at the small cost c of a phone call. The story is represented by
the following information structure:
( p˜1, q˜1, p˜0, q˜0) =
{
{1, 12 , 14 , 12} with probability 12
{12 , 1, 12 , 14} with probability 12
The first case is that of sun: in that case, the optimal choice is to buy sunglasses, since this
would yield a success for sure (p˜1 = 1), while not having bought sunglasses makes clients
unhappy (p˜0 = 14 ). Also, in that case, buying umbrellas is not crucial (q˜1 = q˜0 =
1
2 ). The
case of rain is symmetric. Overall, if c is sufficiently small, it is better to buy both goods.
Simple calculations show that ρ11 = −1 and ρ01 = ρ10 = 1. Thus ρ11ρ10 < 0, and RPE is
optimal.
While with negative correlation insurance can be provided by joint evaluation, this
example illustrate that in fact it is quite intuitive with negative correlation to pay agents
relatively. A double success is indeed more indicative of different efforts than an asym-
metric outcome, which is very likely when both agents exert efforts. This illustrates the
case of informational substitutability.
Example 5 The multiplicative model.
Consider the following setup where the probability of success of an agent is given by:
p˜e = εpe
q˜ f = ηq f
where ε and η are random variable with means 1, variances σ2 and correlation ρ. This
functional form of uncertainty is used as an example in Holmstro¨m (1982) and appears
also in career concerns model (e.g. Dewatripont et al., 1999). Note that all pairs ( p˜e, q˜ f )
have the same correlation ρ, so that ρ11ρ01 = 1. In addition we have σ0 = τ0 = r0σε and
σ1 = τ1 = r1σε, so that γ = 1. Thus IPE is an optimal scheme in that case (but not the
unique one as seen in the proposition). Note that this is true for any level of equilibrium
correlation ρ.
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Example 6 Technological change.
As a last application, consider the problem of implementing technological change. A sta-
tus quo solution consists in using an old, known technology, which generates a success
with fixed probabilities p0 and q0 (so that σ0 = τ0 = 0). In turn, the agents can learn a new
technique, at a cost c, in order to use a new, imperfectly known technology, characterized
by the random probability of success p˜1 = q˜1. In that case, γ = 0, while
ρ11
ρ01
tends to infin-
ity, thus proposition 2 indicates that the optimal way of inducing technological change is
to use a JPE scheme.
4 Risk-averse agents and mixed schemes
Now that we have identified in isolation the effect of pure uncertainty on the optimal
shape of contracts, we turn to the issue of risk-sharing. Indeed, one of the arguments put
forward concerning relative performance evaluation is its risk-filtering property. This
property is better understood when comparing relative performance evaluation to in-
dependent contracts or individual piece-rates (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981) in a context
when agents are risk-averse. When a common noise influences the performance of the
two agents, the principal can use the output of one agents to at least partially correct for
the common noise in the other agent’s incentive scheme, which reduces the risk-premium
to be conceded. The trade-off between incentives and insurance is then solved at smaller
costs.
To treat those aspects, we consider a variant of the model which has the following
features:
• Agents are risk averse with utility separable between money and effort, the mone-
tary part is evaluated according to the concave function u.
• Agents are subject to a participation constraint with reservation utility v, instead of
limited liability.
Thus the payoff of agent 1 now writes:
U1(w|e, f ) = ER [u(wR)|e, f ]− c(e) (5)
while the incentive constraints remains formally the same as (1) and (2).
U1(w|1, 1) ≥ U1(w|0, 1) (6)
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In turn, the limited liability constraint for agent 1 is replaced by the following participa-
tion constraint:
U1(w|1, 1) ≥ v (7)
We are in position to solve the principal’s problem, and to obtain a picture parallelling the
results of the preceding sections. As a first step, the next lemma is a smooth equivalent to
lemma 2:
Lemma 4 Under risk-aversion, the optimal wages are ranked according to their incentive effi-
ciency.
Now, the optimal incentive scheme can be fully characterized, using the definition:
δ =
σ0
1− p0
1− p1
σ1
(8)
Proposition 3 When assumption 1 holds and the agents are risk-averse, the optimal wage profile
is:
if ρ11ρ01 < δ, a scheme with profit sharing at the bottom, relative evaluation at the top with
wSF > wSS > wFS > wFF
if δ < ρ11ρ01 < γ, a pure RPE scheme with
wSF > wSS > wFF > wFS
if ρ11ρ01 > γ, a scheme with profit sharing at the top and relative evaluation at the bottom with
wSS > wSF > wFF > wFS
The interpretation of the result follows directly the lines of the discussion of proposi-
tion 2. In addition, the case of a failure of the agent under consideration (i.e. the cases
FF and FS) matters here, since no wages are constrained by limited liability, and all four
wages have to be chosen. Similarly to the case of a success, the relative informativeness
( σe1−pe ) of a failure is crucial. A simple observation is that under independent productions
and assumption 1, strong complementarity is not possible for any kinds of correlation.
Thus pure JPE can not be optimal given insurance concerns. It is always optimal either to
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filter at least part of the noise through an element of RPE, or to use informational substi-
tutability, which is also done through an element of RPE.
However, it is particularly interesting that mixed schemes are often optimal. Those
schemes mixing an element of RPE and an element of JPE have clear economic interpre-
tations and are indeed used in practice. For example, they correspond to the combination
of profit sharing with selective promotions (in the first case) or selective firing (in the
third case). Finally, this suggests that an analysis in which the level of relative evaluation
is constant over results pairs14 such as in the LEN model (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1990;
Itoh, 1992), is unsatisfactory in that it does not allow for such mixed schemes.
5 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is twofold. First, relative performance evaluation is not
necessarily the best informational tool. The nature and shape of uncertainty may mat-
ter even with risk-neutral agents, and a principal generically benefits from uncertainty
in that case. Regarding the desirability of relative evaluation, the model demonstrates
that standard results in multiagent moral hazard problems are not robust, and identifies
the specificity of previous analyses. In particular, under risk-neutrality, high equilibrium
correlation of the agents’ performances pleads for joint performance evaluation. Second,
under risk-aversion, correlated risks call for noise filtering and two opposite effects have
thus to be traded off in the wage schedule. Optimal mixed schemes balancing those two
effects typically exhibit real-life features that had not been theoretically studied before.
Interestingly, (relative) sticks and carrots are not equivalent in those schemes. This calls
for more thorough inquiry on whether the level of relative evaluation should be higher at
higher performance levels or at lower performance levels.
14While Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) obtain conditions under which an optimal incentive scheme
is linear in aggregate profit, there is no result stating that in a model with multiple observables - possibly
from different agents - should be linear in those performances.
18
References
Aggarwal, R., Samwick, A., 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and
Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Finance 54(6), 1999-
2043.
Anscombe, F., Aumann, R., 1963. A Definition of Subjective Probability, Annals of Math-
ematical Statistics 34, 199205.
d’Aspremont, C., Ge´rard-Varet, L.-A., 1998. Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Part-
nerships under Uncertainty: An Overview, Games and Economic Behavior 25, 3SS-336.
Arya, A., Glover, J., 1995. A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings,
Journal of Economic Theory 66, 507-521.
Arya, A., Glover, J., Hughes, J., 1997. Implementing Coordinated Team Play, Journal of
Economic Theory 74, 218-232.
Baliga, S., Sjo¨stro¨m, T., 1998. Decentralization and Collusion, Journal of Economic Theory
83, 196-232.
Bolton, P., Harris, C., 1999. Strategic Experimentation, Econometrica 67(2), 349-374.
Brusco, S., 1997. Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 73, 395-424.
Che, Y.K., Yoo, S.-W., 2001. Optimal Incentives for Teams, American Economic Review 91,
525-541.
DeGroot, M., 1970. Optimal Statistical Decisions, McGraw-Hill.
Demski, J., Sappington, D., 1984. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 33(1), 152-171.
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., Tirole, J., 1999. The Economics of Career Concerns, Part 1 and
Part 2, Review of Economic Studies 66, 183-217.
Ghirardato, P., Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., 2004. Differentiating ambiguity and ambi-
guity attitude, Journal of Economic Theory 118(2), 133-173.
19
Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D., 1989. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior, Journal
of Mathematical Economics 18(2), 141-153.
Green, J., Stokey, N., 1983. A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 91(3), 349-364.
Halevy, Y., Feltkamp, V., 2005. A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion, Review of
Economic Studies 72(2), 449-466.
Holmstro¨m, B., 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10(1),
74-91.
Holmstro¨m, B., 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
Holmstro¨m, B., Milgrom, P., 1987. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertem-
poral Incentives, Econometrica, 55(2), 303-328.
Holmstro¨m, B., Milgrom, P., 1990. Regulating Trade Among Agents, Journal of Institu-
tional and Theoretical Economics 146, 85-105.
Itoh, H., 1991. Incentives to Help in Multi-Agents Situations, Econometrica 59, 611-636.
Itoh, H., 1992. Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: an Incentive Perspective, Jour-
nal of Law, Economics and Organization 8, 321-345.
Itoh, H. 1993. Coalitions, Incentives and Risk Sharing, Journal of Economic Theory 60,
410-427.
Laffont, J.-J., Martimort, D., 2002. The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Lazear, E., 1989. Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, Journal of Political Economy 97,
561-580.
Lazear, E., Rosen, S., 1981. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 89(5), 841-864.
Ma, C.-T., 1988. Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents, Review
of Economic Studies 55, 555-572.
20
Ma, C.-T., Moore, J., Turnbull, S., 1988. Stopping agents from ”cheating”, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 46(2), 355,372.
Mookherjee, D., 1984. Optimal Incentives Schemes with Many Agents, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 51, 433-446.
Nalebuff, G., Stiglitz, J., 1983. Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Com-
pensation and Competition, Bell Journal of Economics 14, 21-43.
Ramakrishnan, R., Takor, A., 1991. Cooperation versus Competition in Agency, Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization 7, 248-283.
21
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 2
In the principal’s program, let λ > 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
incentive constraint, and µR ≥ 0 that associated with the limited liability constraint wR ≥
0. The first-order conditions for each wR is:
−Prob(R|1, 1) + λ(Prob(R|1, 1)− Prob(R|0, 1)) + µR = 0
If a wage wR is positive then µR = 0 and necessarily:
I(R) =
1
λ
For a wage equal to zero, say wR’, one has I(R’) = 1λ (1 − µR’Prob(R’|1,1)) < 1λ , hence the
conclusion.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Consider the case of complementary effort. By definition, we have:
Prob(SS|1, 1)
Prob(SF|1, 1) ≥
Prob(SS|0, 1)
Prob(SF|0, 1) ⇔
Prob(SS|1, 1)
Prob(SS|0, 1) ≥
Prob(SF|1, 1))
Prob(SF|0, 1)
⇔ h(SS) ≥ h(SF)
and
Prob(FS|1, 1)
Prob(FF|1, 1) ≥
Prob(FS|0, 1)
Prob(FF|0, 1) ⇔
Prob(FS|1, 1)
Prob(FS|0, 1) ≥
Prob(FF|1, 1))
Prob(FF|0, 1)
⇔ h(FS) ≥ h(FF)
From lemma 2, the only wages that can be positive are thus wSS and wFS. Note that we
used equivalences, hence the conclusion. The case of substitute is dealt with similarly.
A.3 Proof of lemma 3
By complementary probabilities and independent productions, we have the identities:
Prob(SS|1, 1)− Prob(SS|0, 1) =− (Prob(FS|1, 1)− Prob(FS|0, 1))
Prob(SF|1, 1)− Prob(SF|0, 1) =− (Prob(FF|1, 1)− Prob(FF|0, 1))
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so that the incentive constraint can be written as:
(Prob(SS|1, 1)− Prob(SS|0, 1))(wSS − wFS)
+ (Prob(SF|1, 1)− Prob(SF|0, 1))(wSF − wFF) ≥ c
Now, we have:
Prob(SS|1, 1)− Prob(SS|0, 1) = E[ p˜1q˜1]−E[ p˜0q˜1] = E[q˜1( p˜1 − p˜0)]
From assumption 1, ( p˜1 − p˜0) is a positive random variable, as is q˜1. Thus the coefficient
of wFS in the incentive constraint is negative, which implies that this wage should be 0.
Similarly, one has:
Prob(SF|1, 1)− Prob(SF|0, 1) = E[ p˜1(1− q˜1)]−E[ p˜0(1− q˜1)]
= E[(1− q˜1)( p˜1 − p˜0)]
which is also positive from the assumption.
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
From the two preceding lemmata, we know that except in the special case I(SS) = I(SF)
only one wage is positive. The criterion for wSS > 0 is I(SS) > I(SF). We need the
following simple calculation to undertake the comparison:
Prob(SS|11) = E[ p˜1q˜1] = p1q1 + ρ11σ1τ1
Prob(SS|01) = E[ p˜0q˜1] = p0q1 + ρ01σ0τ1
Prob(SF|11) = E[ p˜1(1− q˜1)] = p1(1− q1)− ρ11σ1τ1
Prob(SF|01) = E[ p˜0(1− q˜1)] = p0(1− q1)− ρ01σ0τ1
Using those values yields:
Prob(SS|1, 1)
Prob(SS|0, 1) >
Prob(SF|1, 1)
Prob(SF|0, 1) ⇔
q1p1 + ρ11σ1τ1
p0q1 + ρ01σ0τ1
>
p1(1− q1)− ρ11σ1τ1
p0(1− q1)− ρ01σ0τ1
which simply boils down to
ρ11
ρ01
>
p1
σ1
σ0
p0
Conversely, one easily obtains that wSF is positive under the reverse inequality. The op-
timal wages are then straightforwardly obtained by saturating the incentive constraint.
In the case of equality, both wages have the same incentive weight, and only their sum
matters. The optimal sum is also obtained by saturating the incentive constraint.
23
A.5 Proof of lemma 4
We associate the positive multipliers λ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 to, respectively, the incentive and
participation constraints, and form the Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem:
L(w,λ, µ) = ΣRProb(R|11)wR + λc + µ(v + c)
−ΣR [λ (Prob(R|11)− Prob(R|01)) + µProb(R|11)] u(wR)
It is clear that both multipliers have to be positive. The first-order conditions for all R boil
down to:
1
u′(wR)
= µ+ λ
Prob(R|11)− Prob(R|01)
Prob(R|11) = µ+ λI(R)
Note that 1u′ is an increasing function, thus w’s are ranked as
1
u′(w) . This means that the
wages are ranked according to their incentive efficiency.
A.6 Proof of proposition 3
The ranking between wSS and wSF corresponds to the criterion of the first proposition,
which yields:
wSS ≥ wSF if and only if ρ11ρ01 > γ
Also, from assumption 1, we have:
Prob(FS|11)− Prob(FS|01) = E[(1− p˜1)q˜1]−E[(1− p˜0)q˜1]
= E[q˜1( p˜0 − p˜1)] ≤ 0
and
Prob(FF|11)− Prob(FF|01) = E[(1− p˜1)(1− q˜1)]−E[(1− p˜0)(1− q˜1)]
= E[(1− q˜1)( p˜0 − p˜1)] ≤ 0
Which indicate that both I(FS) and I(FF) are negative, while we have already seen that
I(SS) and I(SF) are positive. This implies that wSS and wSF are always higher than wFF
and wFS. To finish the proof, we need the ranking between wFF and wFS, which requires
a few additional calculations:
Prob(FS|11) = E[(1− p˜1)q˜1] = q1(1− p1)− ρ11σ1τ1
Prob(FS|01) = E[(1− p˜0)q˜1] = q1(1− p0)− ρ01σ0τ1
Prob(FF|11) = E[(1− p˜1)(1− q˜1)] = (1− p1)(1− q1) + ρ11σ1τ1
Prob(FF|01) = E[(1− p˜0)(1− q˜1)] = (1− p0)(1− q1) + ρ01σ0τ1
24
Using those values and conducing calculations parallelling that in the other comparison
yields:
I(FS)− I(FF) > 0⇔ ρ11
ρ01
<
σ0
1− p0
1− p1
σ1
= δ
Note that δ < γ, so that a JPE scheme can never be optimal, since it would require at the
same time wSS ≥ wSF and wFS ≥ wFF. All the other combinations are in turn possible,
depending on the parameters.
25
